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Abstract 
Purpose: We aim to offer empirical evidence about the effect of the interaction between the 
audit committee and internal audit function (IAF) on the moral courage of the chief audit 
executive (CAE).  
 
Methodology: We follow a mixed approach. In a first stage, we sent questionnaires to CAEs 
of 60 listed, financial and non-financial Tunisian companies. To enhance the depth of our 
analysis, we performed, in the second stage, semi-directed interviews with 22 CAEs from listed 
financial and non-financial Tunisian companies. 
 
Findings: We find that the existence of private access to the audit committee has a positive 
effect on the moral courage of the CAE. The number of meetings between the audit committee 
and the CAE, the examination of internal audit programs and results together with the 
contribution of the audit committee to the appointment and dismissal of the CAE do not show 
a significant link with the moral courage of the CAE. We also find an insignificant relationship 
between the audit committee’s examination of interaction between management and the IAF 
and the moral courage of the CAE. 
 
 
Originality: To the best of our knowledge, we fill one of the major research gaps in the auditing 
literature by demonstrating the critical role of audit committee-internal audit interaction in 
promoting the CAE’s moral courage to behave ethically.  
 
Keywords: audit committee - internal audit interaction; chief audit executive; moral courage; 
professional ethics; Tunisia 
1. Introduction 
Although the professional and ethical standards of the internal audit function guide the internal 
auditor to play the role of truth teller in an organizational context, internal auditors still face an 
ethical conflict (Roussy, 2013) when the disclosure of audit results might have a negative effect 
on the profit, position or survival of their companies or on their careers (Courtemanche 1988; 
Miceli and Near 1988). The ethical behaviour of the internal auditor may be compromised such 
that even the most ethical and impartial internal auditors may behave unethically to protect 
themselves (Roussy, 2013; Norman et al. 2010). Indeed, an increasing body of research asserts 
that internal auditors instead frequently remain silent out of fear of unpleasant personal and 
professional consequences stemming from organizational pressures (Everett and Tremblay, 
2014; Norman et al., 2010; James, 2003; Chadwick; 1995; Kalbers, 1992). 
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In an attempt to remedy the problems generated by these ethical dilemmas and to find ways to 
help people resist pressure and overcome fear to behave ethically, there is a great consensus 
that “we need to promote moral courage” (Comer and Vega, 2001: p.xvii). Indeed, moral 
courage explains why an individual acts ethically when another who arrives at the same ethical 
decision point and in the same position does not (Schilpzand et al., 2015; Harbour and Kisfalvi, 
2014; Koerner, 2014; Hannah et al.,2011; Sekerka and Bagozzi, 2007; Lopez et al., 2003). 
Despite the existence of a fairly limited number of studies (Everett and Tremblay, 2014; Roussy, 
2012; Chambers et al., 2010; Mat Zain and Subramaniam, 2007; Libby and Thorne, 2004, 2007; 
Thorne, 1998) focused on the importance of courage in auditor behaviour when he/she is facing 
ethical dilemmas, research on the factors affecting the moral courage of the internal auditor 
remains rare. However, we can find many studies (Alzeban, 2015; Zaman and Sarens, 2013; 
Stewart and Subramaniam, 2010; Scarbrough, et al., 1998; Rezaee and Lander, 1993) that 
emphasize the important role of the audit committee in supporting the internal auditor. These 
studies show that an internal audit function that receives strong support from the audit 
committee is likely to be more objective and powerful in the implementation of controls, thus 
allowing the internal auditor to address any type of conflict that may affect ethical behaviour 
(Mat Zain et al., 2006). 
Thus, in our paper, we aim to study whether the interaction between the audit committee and 
the internal audit function has an effect on the moral courage of the internal auditor. The 
relationship between the audit committee and the internal audit function encompasses a variety 
of activities such as meetings of the audit committee with the Chief Audit Executive (CAE), 
private access for the CAE, the review of programs and results of the internal audit by the audit 
committee, the audit committee’s role in the appointment and dismissal of the CAE and the 
examination of management’s interaction with the IAF by the audit committee (Alzeban, 2015; 
Raghunandan et al., 2001; Scarbrough et al., 1998). We therefore examine how audit 
committee-internal audit interaction could affect the moral courage of the CAE.  
Considering moral courage to be “…a more rare commodity than bravery in battle … it is the 
one essential, vital quality of those who seek to change a world which yields most painfully to 
change”— Robert F. Kennedy (Gini, p. 5, in Comer and Vega, 2011), the main motivation that 
encourages us to investigate the Tunisian context is that Tunisia is in the midst of a revolution 
on the economic, financial and social levels to fight corruption. Hence, it is necessary to 
consider how to fight against fraud, illegal acts and unethical behaviour. In addition, the 
transformation from a dictatorship to a democratic context allows us to discuss the courage 
required to be honest and impartial, given the decrease in the fear of unfair consequences 
potentially caused by telling the truth.  
Financial scandals involving the regular appearance of auditors in news headlines urge 
academic researchers, professional organizations and institutions (e.g., the Institute of Internal 
Auditors (IIA)) to develop solutions to encourage internal auditors to speak about management 
fraud and not keep silent. Consequently, our findings can provide a practical solution by 
revealing the effect of audit committee behaviour on the moral courage of the CAE to tell the 
truth and not remain silent.  
We encourage regulators and standard setters to draft regulations and oversee the relationship 
between audit committees and the internal audit function to reduce the pressure exerted by 
management and to inhibit fear of reprisals or threats of dismissal for telling the truth. Moreover, 
we believe these actors can benefit from our study by obliging Tunisian public companies to 
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establish audit committees to cooperate with internal auditors and support them to strengthen 
their objectivity and autonomy, thus strengthening their moral courage. 
Agreeing that auditors have lost their moral compass (Everett and Tremblay, 2014), we believe 
that our study enhances the IIA by rethinking the question, “Why is ethics instruction not 
working?” (Comer and Vega, 2011, p.xv) In fact, the IIA should be aware that in the ethical 
code, it is insufficient to focus only on the ethics of auditing; it is also necessary to consider 
moral courage an ethical characteristic of the internal auditor. 
In addition, ethics training and education in organizational settings unfortunately continues to 
concentrate on demanding regulation and imposing compliance controls rather than building 
moral strength. We believe our study can increase the awareness of business schools about 
training accounting students to develop moral courage during ethical courses because it is 
insufficient only to know what they should do; they also must have the courage to do it.  
We contribute to the auditing literature by offering the first study to identify the effect of the 
relationship between the audit committee and the internal audit function on the moral courage 
of the CAE. The study is based on a rich body of literature from different fields (organizational, 
accounting philosophical, ethical and socio-psychological) that highlights the significant role 
of moral courage in overcoming conflict and fear to behave ethically by telling the truth and, 
ultimately, to respect the IIA’s standards and ethical code, which enhance the CAE’s objectivity 
and integrity in reporting sensitive issues relating to the manager and not keeping silent. As a 
result, our study also may offer answers to such questions as ‘where were the internal auditors?’ 
and ‘Why didn’t they see this crisis coming?’, which are raised by Sarens (2014). 
Our results show that the existence of private access to the audit committee has a positive effect 
on the moral courage of the CAE. The number of meetings between the audit committee and 
the CAE, the examination of internal audit programs and results together with the contribution 
of the audit committee to the appointment and dismissal of the CAE do not show a significant 
link with the moral courage of the CAE. We also find an insignificant relationship between the 
audit committee’s examination of the interaction between management and the IAF and the 
moral courage of the CAE.  
Our research is based on behavioural theory, which is presented in section 2. Section 3 discusses 
the research background and reviews relevant literature. We develop our hypotheses in Section 
4 and discuss the research design in Section 5. We present our results (concerning the 
questionnaires and the semi-directed interviews) in Section 6 and discuss our results in Section 
7. Section 8 concludes. 
2. Internal auditor’s moral courage and behavioural theory 
According to Osswald et al. (2012), moral courage is defined as courageous behaviour; it "is 
an important virtue in society”, and it “is not an innate behavior but can be learned and trained” 
(Osswald et al., 2012, p.401). Similarly, Bierhoff (2002) considers moral courage a subtype of 
prosocial behaviour, noting that pro-social behaviour “covers a broad range of actions intended 
to benefit one or more people" (Batson, 1998, p. 282). Behaviourist theory is one learning 
approach; it states that behavioural change is caused by stimuli from the environment (John B. 
Watson, 1878-1958). According to Sekerka and Bagozzi (2007), the development of the 
willingness to act with moral courage is influenced by personal factors, which are in turn 
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dependent upon social forces, such as management, social norms, perceived rewards or 
punishments, and other contextual factors.  
Hannah et al. (2013) view moral courage as malleable and under contextual influences. They 
recognize that pressure from managers is the factor that most inhibits moral courage in the 
workplace because managers have the power to punish their employees (Depret and Fiske, 
1993). According to Zaini and Taylor (2009), this negative effect can be reduced through a 
close working relationship between the internal auditor and other supervisory bodies such as 
the audit committee. The authors support that this relationship offers the potential for the 
internal auditor to address any type of conflict that might affect his/her behaviour. 
 
In the same vein, O'Leary and Stewart (2007) shed light on the audit committee as an effective 
means of strengthening the position of the internal audit function by providing a supportive 
environment (Gramling et al.,2004) in which the chief audit executive can raise matters 
affecting management. Alzeban (2015) supports this view by arguing that the interaction of the 
internal audit function with the audit committee can establish a power base for the internal audit 
function.  
 
Therefore, based on behavioural theory, we consider the interaction between the audit 
committee and the internal audit function to be a stimulus that promotes the CAE’s moral 
courage to disclose fraud committed by top managers. 
3. Research Background and Relevant Literature 
3.1 Internal auditing conflicts and fear 
Unlike their external homologues, who generally report to the "principal" of an entity (e.g., 
shareholders), internal auditors generally report to those who are closely associated with 
"agents" (i.e., audit committee members) or to the agents themselves (e.g., top managers) 
(Norman et al., 2010; Barrett, 1988). Indeed, the internal auditor, who is considered the first 
line of defence against fraud (Rezaee and Lander, 1993), must inform the audit committee about 
any irregularities or fraudulent activities of which he/she becomes aware. In particular, if the 
manager is involved in fraud, the internal auditor must immediately communicate the relevant 
details to the audit committee (Rezaee and Lander, 1993). Conversely, internal auditors are 
more deeply submerged in organizational politics and are more often threatened by symbolic 
sanctions. Consequently, they are under pressure to submit to and satisfy the demands of 
management by playing the role of secret keepers (Roussy, 2013). Hence, the different 
motivations, incentives and threats faced by the internal auditor can generate a number of 
conflicts between the objectives of the internal audit function (e.g., control of the accuracy and 
reliability of financial information) and the objectives of the organization and management (e.g., 
profitability and maximizing shareholder or managers’ wealth) (Chambers,2014; Roussy, 2013; 
Stewart and Subramaniam, 2010). According to Van Peursem (2005), the internal auditors face 
various conflicting roles; they navigate between the roles of “auditor” (to be independent of 
his/her manager) and of “consultant” (working for the interests of his/her manager). In his study, 
Van Peursem (2005) finds that a close relationship of the internal auditor with his/her manager 
can compromise his/her independence because he/she tends to protect the interests of the 
manager rather than remain impartial (Colbert, 2002), although the definition of internal audit 
implies that internal auditors must be independent and objective in performing their duties (The 
Institute of Internal Auditors, 2009). He concludes that it is therefore not surprising that internal 
auditors can face familiarity and threats of social pressure arising from their relationships with 
managers.  
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This view is supported by Ahmad and Taylor (2009), who argue that the presence of more 
conflicting roles reduces the level of care the internal auditor has for his/her independence. 
They envision that conflicting roles are present because of the complexity of the environment 
in which the internal auditor works.  
Drawing on role theory (Katz and Kahn, 1978) and the ‘model of coping with role conflict’ 
established by Hall (1972), Roussy (2013) attempts to reveal the roles that internal auditors 
actually play. She relies on the concept of “coping” to explore how internal auditors manage 
the role conflicts they encounter. As a result, Roussy (2013) finds that internal auditing is a 
function at the service of the top manager by performing a protector role, that of keeping secrets. 
She explains that when acting as secret keepers, internal auditors seek to hide or censor critical 
information that the top manager is keen to conceal from the members of the audit committee. 
She adds that when internal auditors conceal information from the members of the audit 
committee, their role as keepers of secrets is in conflict with the ethical norms and rules 
governing the internal audit practice.  
 
These findings are supported in the recent study of Roussy (2015). Based again on the ‘model 
of coping with role conflict’, She examines and analyzes role conflicts experienced by internal 
auditors and their role conflict coping strategies during the internal audit process as demanded 
under IIA standards. Roussy (2015) demonstrates that internal auditor coping behaviour has a 
cumulative effect on their lack of independence and, eventually, on the objectivity of the 
internal auditing function and its capacity to perform its expected role in protecting the public 
interest. 
 
The conflicted role of internal auditors generates conflicting perceptions of internal auditing 
quality. Drawing on framing theory, Roussy and Brivot (2015, forthcoming) find that internal 
auditors and audit committee members frame internal audit quality by relying on how useful 
they view the achieved work will be to the organization’s top manager. Their view differs from 
that of external auditors, who describe the internal auditor as “watchdog” and highlight 
independence from top management as a determinant quality criterion. Internal auditors also 
diverge from the IIA’s frame because performing in perfect accordance with professional 
standards matters less, from their perspective, than being of tangible and practical value to the 
decision makers of organizations. 
Traditionally, it has been argued that audit conflicts represent an important source of ethical 
dilemmas that the auditor confronts (Thompson 2003; Arnold and Ponemon, 1991; Gul 1991). 
The auditors’ ability to resist pressure from top managers in a conflict situation has been a 
recurring theme in the auditor independence literature (Stewart and Subramaniam, 2010; Knapp, 
1985). Jones and Deckro (1993) assert that when expectations received, for a given role, conflict 
with the values and morals of the receiver roles, an ethical conflict occurs. 
However, when the auditor is confronted with a challenge to ethics, which Rest (1986) called 
the recognition of a moral issue, pressure can provide the auditor a reason to act or to remain 
silent. The auditor faces the refrain, ‘do I speak, or do I keep quiet?’ (Berry 2004). When 
employees do not react, they become ‘inactive observers’ or ‘silent observers’ (Miceli and Near, 
1992). Thompson (2003) claims that internal auditors can address situations that require them 
to report fraud (Barrier, 2003), but it is not always easy, particularly when management 
pressures them to "go with the flow" instead of "making waves" (Thompson, 2003, p.72). 
Business ethics literature has shown that increasing conflict between the values of 
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organizational actors contributes to an increase in fear and favouritism (Harris, 2003). An 
overwhelming body of research defines employee silence as a deliberate withholding of 
information and affirms that would-be speakers are kept silent by fear (Kish-Gephart and 
Bureaux-Soignet, 2013; Kish-Gephart et al., 2009; Milliken et al., 2003; Dutton et al., 2002; 
Johannesen, 1974). Being aware of their fear, would-be speakers consider the alternatives and 
make a conscious decision to conceal relevant input (Kish-Gephart and Bureaux-Soignet, 2013; 
Kish-Gephart et al., 2009). Consequently, when internal auditors withhold information and do 
not report the fraud committed by their superiors, this is a calculative choice to protect 
themselves from potential risks such as losing their job (Norman et al., 2010; James, 2003; 
Chadwick, 1995; Kalbers, 1992). The literature depicts such a pattern of action as a ‘defensive 
silence’ (Kish-Gephart et al., 2009).  
Norman et al. (2010) note that reporting to the audit committee places internal auditors in a 
difficult position in relation to the top manager of the organization. In their study, Norman et 
al. (2010) ask experienced internal auditors to assess the risk of fraud; the results show that 
internal auditors who must report to their managers feel threatened in this process. However, 
they argue that the internal auditors feel more threatened when they report directly to the audit 
committee because they tend to decrease their assessment of the risk of fraud when they must 
report to the audit committee rather than the executive.  
 
Chadwick (1995) reports an interview in which 12 CAEs of major publicly listed companies 
were asked whether they would report any of several possible offenses by senior management 
such as restricting the exposure of evidence from an audit and restricting information flow to 
the audit committee. All of the interviewees said that they would not report the incidents 
because they would most likely be fired and would never find another job as a chief audit 
executive. In the same vein, Kalbers (1992) reveals similar concerns from a survey of CAEs in 
which most respondents cited career concerns behind their reluctance to report problems to the 
audit committee.  
 
Although extensive research has shed light on the ethical conflict inherent to the internal audit 
function and on the effect of fear on the reluctance of internal auditors to tell the truth, there has 
been little focus on how to reduce their fear and increase their moral courage to overcome 
ethical conflicts. Therefore, our study provides an exciting opportunity to advance our 
knowledge of the role of the audit committee in enhancing the moral courage of the internal 
auditor. 
 
3.2 Moral courage – a guarantee of professional ethical behaviour  
The concept of moral courage appears to have been initially popularized in the business ethics 
literature by O'Toole (1985), but he merely describes it as the quality of management when 
making ethical decisions during a social controversy or when addressing other similar issues 
(Mahoney, 1998). De George (1993) then explains the importance of moral courage in acting 
according to ethical standards in difficult situations in the workplace. Mahoney (1995) 
emphasizes the importance of this moral courage, based on examples from the conference 
"Development in the Underdeveloped World: A New Challenge for Business Ethics" in Hong 
Kong in 1995, in which moral courage was considered essential in situations of corruption and 
extortion (Mahoney, 1998, p.188). 
According to Jackson (1996), ethical problems are not only limited to acute dilemmas or 
identification problems in which it is difficult to work out the best action but also include 
compliance issues in which the correct action is easily identified but is difficult to implement. 
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Indeed, acting ethically is not only acting in the pursuit of good instead of evil but also having 
the inner strength to refrain from giving in to moral temptations (Monin et al., 2007). This view 
is consistent with the Stoic view of ethics and moral courage (Putnam, 2010). 
Moreover, Harris (2003) recognizes the need to encourage the development of the moral force 
in the workplace; according to Verschoor (2004), doing so will require more than a reinvention 
of programs, policies and penalties. Gates (2004) states that we must bring about a change in 
behaviour, and he calls for a revolution of character and a reintroduction of personal conscience, 
responsibility and values.  
In the same vein, Sekerka et al. (2009) note that because character development can increase 
the value of an organization, it is regrettable that the teaching of ethics in organizational 
contexts continues to focus on demanding regulation and enforcing compliance rather than 
building a moral force. These issues are likely to motivate researchers in positive psychology 
and positive organizational theory to solve this problem by explaining character strength 
(Peterson and Seligman, 2004) and virtue based on moral performance (Cameron et al., 2003). 
Peterson and Seligman (2004) conclude that courageous actions are a fusion of forces including 
courage, perseverance, integrity and vitality; this fusion promotes the desire to achieve 
objectives despite external or internal opposition. In the same context, Sekerka and Bagozzi 
(2007, p. 132) raise the question, “Why is moral courage in the workplace viewed as the unusual, 
rather than the norm? If we want to cultivate organizational environments that exhibit moral 
strength, we must consider how courage can be exercised in daily organizational life as an 
action that can be achieved by everyone”. They support that to confront and resolve those 
ethical issues that hinder the ability to perform the correct action, a strong desire is necessary. 
Indeed, the practice of moral courage, which is a moral force, is an important feature for 
members of an organization (Verschoor, 2004) and a quality or attribute necessary for ethical 
behaviour in organizational contexts (Hesselbein, 2005; Pears, 2004). 
Moral courage has been described as a managerial virtue (Srivastva and Cooperrider, 1998) or 
an executive virtue associated with the will, and it is considered an important feature of efficient 
managers (DePree 1997). It is also an attribute that motivates and enables people to take the 
right course of action given the risks involved (Harris, 1999). According to Pincoffs (1986), 
people, as individuals, are more likely to successfully overcome difficulties if they are 
sufficiently persistent, not easily discouraged, and sufficiently brave to face the challenges. 
Hannah et al. (2011) argue that modern organizations are morally complicated environments 
that therefore impose significant ethical requirements and challenges on their members; these 
members must have sufficient levels of moral courage to promote ethical action while refraining 
from any immoral action in the presence of temptations or pressures. These authors show that 
moral courage is positively related to ethical behaviour. In line with Kidder (2005) and Sekerka 
and Bagozzi (2007), Hannah et al. (2011) conclude that moral courage explains why one actor 
acts in an ethical manner, whereas another who faces the same ethical judgment in the same 
situation does not act in an ethical manner. 
3.3 Moral courage and the internal auditor’s ethical behaviour  
Considering moral courage to be a psychological force (Gruber, 2011) and the virtue of 
willpower (Harbour and Kisfalvi, 2014), several attempts have been made to reveal its 
significant role in enabling ethical behaviour by auditors and accountants (Armstrong et al. 
2003; Libby and Thorne; 2004, 2007; Chambers et al., 2010; Roussy, 2012; Everett and 
Tremblay, 2014).  
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Building on Thorne’s (1998) model of ethical decision making, Armstrong et al. (2003) note 
moral courage as an instrumental virtue that explains auditors’ ability to act in accordance with 
their ethical intentions. Virtue, according to Thorne (1998), is a characteristic of a decision 
maker acting on morals because the possession and exercise of virtue tends to increase the 
probability that the decision maker will act in accordance with ethical judgments (Armstrong 
et al., 2003). 
The model proposed by Thorne (1998) (Figure 1) integrates the model of ethical behaviour of 
James Rest (1986) and the principles of the ethical theory of virtue. This model consists of four 
components (Rest et al., 1999, p 101): 
(1) Moral sensibility: interpreting the situation by becoming aware of how different 
actions affect the parties concerned, imagining causes and effects from chains of events, 
and being aware that there is a moral problem when it exists. 
 
(2) Moral judgment: determining what action would be morally justifiable. 
 
(3) Moral motivation: the degree of commitment to following moral action by 
enhancing the responsibility of moral values over other values and taking personal 
responsibility for moral outcomes. 
 
(4) Moral character: persisting in a moral task and having the courage to implement a 
moral goal. 
 
Figure 1. Thorne’s integrated model of ethical decision making 
 
Source: Armstrong et al. (2003, p. 3) 
 
Thorne (1998) states that the first two components (moral sensitivity and moral judgment) of 
the Rest model are primarily intellectual in nature, whereas the last two components (moral 
motivation and moral character) are closely related to virtue (Armstrong et al., 2003, p.3). 
Analyzing Thorne’s model, Armstrong et al. (2003) indicate that moral development and virtue 
are necessary for the auditor’s ethical behaviour. They suggest that moral development includes 
sensitivity to the moral content of a situation or an ethical dilemma and normative reasoning 
with the ability to understand the issues and to arrive at an ethical judgment. They also suggest 
that virtue includes ethical motivation, which describes the willingness of an individual to place 
the interests of others before his own and also includes ethical character. 
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Armstrong et al. (2003) add that virtue comprises two elements: moral virtue and instrumental 
virtue. Indeed, an ethical act for the benefit of others is an intention towards moral virtue. 
Instrumental virtue, which includes courage, helps the auditor realize his intentions. In fact, 
"the integrative perspective suggests that an individual’s ethical character is a reflection of his 
or her instrumental virtue" (Thorne 1998, p. 299). 
 
To conclude, Rest et al. (1999) emphasize that moral courage is an essential virtue to move 
from ethical intention to ethical behaviour. Sánchez and Cabello-Medina (2013) support this 
view and write that, despite all of the possible internal and external difficulties, this ability to 
perform ethical decisions is courage. Thus, the more developed a person’s moral courage is, the 
more likely it is that the person goes from moral motivation to ethical behaviour. This view 
leads the authors to conclude that moral courage positively affects the moral character of 
individuals. 
Based on Pincoffs (1986), Libby and Thorne (2007) conduct a qualitative study to identify the 
set of virtues that are associated with the ethical judgment of auditors and allow them to realize 
their ethical intentions. The authors reveal that courage is an instrumental virtue that plays a 
key role in promoting the ethical judgment of auditors. Similarly, courage is defined as one of 
the internal auditor qualities essential to ensuring integrity at the conference of General Audit 
Management (GAM) – "A soul of a leader, the seven personal qualities that maximize the 
impact of the most efficient internal audit directors", organized by the IIA in 2010 in Florida 
and presented by Chambers (CEO of the Institute of Internal Auditors), Charles (Senior Client 
Partner in the Korn/Ferry International Atlanta office and a member of the Financial Officers 
Center of Expertise) and Park (Senior Client Partner in the Korn/Ferry International San 
Francisco office and a member of the Financial Officers Center of Expertise). Based on a series 
of interviews with many CAEs and members of audit committees in the United States and 
around the world led by the recruiting firm Korn/Ferry International and The Institute of 
Internal Auditors (IIA), Chambers et al. (2010) attempt to identify the essential qualities for a 
successful chief internal auditor.  
In their study, responders agree about the need for courage in a context of adversity. Faced with 
pressures and considerable obstacles, "You must be ready to fight alone when things go wrong 
and to transmit a message quickly," said Mark Arning (Senior Vice President and General 
Auditor, New York Life Insurance Company). "You have to want to act for the good of the 
company and not to think about your own career". Chambers et al. (2010) conclude, "Nothing 
is likely to cause as much harm to the entire profession and damage its reputation as a media 
unleashing against a chief audit executive arrested for fraud." 
In the same vein, Roussy (2012) determines how members of the audit committee appreciate 
the competence of the internal auditor. She conducts semi-structured interviews with fourteen 
members of audit committees working in Quebec's public sector. Roussy (2012) finds that 
members of the audit committee nourish many expectations concerning internal auditors and 
that they usually have a clear idea of what a competent internal auditor is. She identifies the 
skills and values expected in an internal auditor when considering the appropriate role of the 
internal audit function. Indeed, these expectations are demonstrated when the interviewees were 
asked about the criteria they expect in a competent internal auditor. She expressed these criteria 
in terms of the skills and values expected in internal auditors when considering the role of the 
internal audit function within a public organization. Hence, members of audit committees place 
importance on the values and personal skills of internal auditors when they appreciate their 
competence. Moral values that stand out are integrity and courage, whereas the essential skills 
for the internal auditor are the ability to synthesize, critical thinking, the capacity to 
10 
 
communicate effectively both in writing and orally, relationship skills and political sense. In 
addition, according to members of audit committees, possessing all of these skills and values 
allows the internal auditor to exercise judgment (Roussy, 2012). 
In their detailed examination of Cynthia Cooper’s autobiography (ex-Vice President of Internal 
Audit of WorldCom), Everett and Tremblay (2014) attempt to identify the crucial practical 
virtues that led Cynthia Cooper to behave ethically and blow the whistle. They find that 
Cooper’s decision to step forward and bring the WorldCom fraud to light is based on her 
courage and her endurance of threats. Indeed, Cynthia Cooper, who was ‘admired for her 
courage’ (Everett and Tremblay, 2014, p.6), shows her positive adaptation in the face of 
adversity, threats and risks. She has had to address serious consequences including 
demoralization, loneliness, humiliation, and several real physical costs. Everett and Tremblay 
(2014) describe Cynthia Cooper as a heroic accountant who earned the title of “Person of the 
Year 2002”, an award by Time Magazine. 
 
As shown previously, research to date has tended to focus only on the critical role of moral 
courage in reaching an ethical behaviour by resisting pressures and risks, but it has not 
addressed the factors that can influence (increase or decrease) the moral courage of the internal 
auditor. This paper seeks to fill this gap by examining the effect of the audit committee on the 
moral courage of the CAE. 
 
4. Development of Hypotheses 
Corporate governance guidelines and quotation rules (Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999; Smith 
Committee, 2003; the FRC’s (2012); Guidance on Audit Committees and FRC’s (2014) 
Corporate Governance Code) explicitly recognize the governance role played by audit 
committees in [1] supervising the relationship between management and internal auditors and 
[2] supporting the internal audit, and highlight the need for a strong working relationship 
between the IAF and audit committee to ensure good corporate governance (Alzeban,2015; 
Zaman and Sarens, 2013).  
 
Indeed, an internal audit function that receives strong support from the audit committee is likely 
to be more objective and powerful in its ability to implement controls (Alzeban, 2015; Lin et 
al., 2011; O'Leary and Stewart, 2007; Mat Zain et al., 2006; Allegrini et al., 2006). 
According to Alzeban (2015), the audit committee is considered an important tool for increasing 
the organizational status and independence of the internal audit function. Alzeban (2015) adds 
that the nature of the interaction between the audit committee and the internal audit can 
significantly influence the effectiveness of the internal audit by affecting its conformance with 
the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (ISPPIA) and 
consequently promote the internal auditor’s courage when there is a need to report fraud and 
irregularities committed by management (Scarbrough et al., 1998).  
 
In the same vein, Stewart and Subramaniam (2010) assert that in recent years, audit committees 
have undertaken an important governance role in coordinating and monitoring the relationship 
between managers, internal auditors and external auditors. It is deemed a significant safeguard 
mechanism for internal auditors in managing their professional objectivity (Lin et al., 2011). 
Moreover, the independence of the internal auditor depends on his/her relationship with the 
audit committee (Stewart and Subramaniam, 2010; Allegrini et al., 2006). 
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Similarly, Zaini and Taylor (2009) assert that a close working relationship between the internal 
auditor and the audit committee is required. Furthermore, the audit committee should be 
considered a potential resource that the internal auditor can use to address the types of conflict 
that might affect his/her behaviour. 
The role of the audit committee in supporting the internal audit is also evident in James’ (2003) 
study. Indeed, James (2003) investigates the perceptions of bank lending officers concerning 
the effect of reporting structure on the internal audit’s ability to prevent financial statement 
fraud. He finds that internal audit functions that report solely to the audit committee are more 
able to prevent fraudulent reporting compared with those functions that report to senior 
management.  
 
However, interaction with the internal audit committee is a broad concept and includes various 
activities (Alzeban, 2015; Rezaee and Lander, 1993). In our study, guided by previous studies 
(Raghunandan et al.,2001; Scarbrough et al., 1998), we focus on the following five points: (1) 
the number of meetings between the audit committee and the CAE, (2) the existence of private 
access for the CAE, (3) the review of the internal audit program and its results, (4) the 
responsibility for the appointment and dismissal of the CAE and (5) the review of the 
relationship between internal audit and management. 
Law 2011-06 in Tunisia, the Treadway Commission (1987), and the Toronto Stock Exchange 
Committee on Corporate Governance (TSECCG1994) all note that the audit committee should 
have a direct communication channel with the internal audit to discuss and review specific 
issues and to exchange pertinent information on a timely basis (Zaman and Sarens, 2013; Mat 
Zain et al., 2006; Scarbrough et al., 1998). Regular meetings between the audit committee and 
the CAE increase the probability that the audit committee will be competent and informed about 
relevant issues in accounting and auditing, permitting it to help the internal auditors resolve any 
problems identified (Mat Zain et al., 2006). 
 
Based on a comparative study of audit committees, the Institute of Internal Auditors suggests 
that to be effective, an audit committee should meet with the chief audit executive at least four 
times per year (Raghunandan et al., 2001). Alzeban (2015) reveals that frequent meetings 
between the CAE and the audit committee improve internal audit conformance with the 
International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (ISPPIA). 
 
Furthermore, a high number of meetings between the audit committee and the CAE can promote 
the internal auditor’s willingness to act independently and objectively and can promote the 
courage to make an ethical decision (James 2003; Scarbrough et al., 1998). This effect will be 
influenced by a decrease in pressure from superiors, which in turn can decrease the CAE’s fear 
of punishment.  
 
Building on behavioural theory, the number of meetings between the audit committee and the 
chief audit executive is deemed a stimulus that increases his/her moral courage. Thus, we 
hypothesize that  
 
Hypothesis 1: The moral courage of the CAE is positively related to the number of meetings 
with the audit committee. 
Being aware that the internal auditor’s reluctance to report problems to the audit committee 
appears to be exacerbated by restricted access to the audit committee (James, 2003), the Blue 
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Ribbon Committee report (NYSE and NASD, 1999, p.30) emphasizes that the lines of 
communication and reporting should encourage “[i]nternal auditors to express freely, regularly 
and on a confidential basis, with the audit committee”. In the same context, the BRC report (p. 
39) suggests that it is essential to have formal mechanisms in place to facilitate confidential 
exchanges between the internal auditor and the audit committee. Indeed, due to the sensitive 
issues handled by internal audit, meetings between the CAE and the audit committee must be 
conducted in private, without the presence of top managers (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993) 
because if the audit committee interacts with the internal auditor in the presence of management, 
he/she may become less courageous and less sincere (James, 2003). Building on behavioural 
theory, we consider the existence of private access to the committee to be a stimulus that fosters 
the moral courage of the chief audit executive. Hence, we hypothesize that  
 
Hypothesis 2: The moral courage of the CAE is positively related to the existence of private 
access to the audit committee. 
 
Law 2011-06 in Tunisia, the BRC report and the Treadway Commission (1987) also insist on 
the audit committee’s responsibility for ensuring the implementation of a system of internal 
controls and for this system’s efficiency. To fulfil this responsibility effectively, audit 
committees are required to (1) review the internal audit proposals related to programs, plans 
and coordination with external auditors to ensure that the scope of the internal audit program is 
sufficient and (2) review the results of the internal audit as it relates to financial reporting, 
internal control and compliance with laws and regulations (Roussy 2013; Raghunandan, et al., 
2001). 
 
Consequently, the internal auditor is responsible for providing reliable and transparent 
information. Based on behavioural theory, we consider the review of internal auditing programs 
and results by the audit committee to be a stimulus that promotes the moral courage of the chief 
audit executive. As a result, we hypothesize that  
 
Hypothesis 3: The moral courage of the CAE is positively related to the review of internal 
auditing programs and results by the audit committee. 
 
According to Norman et al. (2010) and Roussy (2012, 2013), the status of the internal auditor 
has significant implications for his/her effectiveness. More precisely, the more independent 
internal auditors are from their managers, the more likely it is that they will be objective and 
unbiased. Furthermore, because the top manager often makes personnel decisions concerning 
internal audit, an internal auditor must risk his/her job and career to report offenses and fraud 
by top managers (Roussy, 2013; James, 2003).  
 
The negative effects of the manager’s authority to dismiss audit personnel with willingness to 
report negative information repeatedly emerge in concerns expressed by internal auditors 
(James, 2003). The National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (1992) and the 
Chartered Institute of Internal Auditors (CIIA, 2013) recognize this hazard when they 
recommend that the selection and dismissal of the chief audit executive occur only with the 
board of directors’ or audit committee’s concurrence (James, 2003; Alzeban, 2015).  
 
According to Alzeban (2015), decisions on the appointment and dismissal of the CAE should 
when necessary be made without any influence from the manager to permit the CAE to fulfil 
his/her duties impartially (Chambers, 2014). Indeed, when the audit committee is involved in 
hiring and firing decisions, the internal audit function becomes able and confident to report on 
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poor managerial behaviour without a fear of reprisals and retaliation (Alzeban, 2015; Allison; 
1994). 
 
Stewart and Subramaniam (2010) envision that the involvement of the audit committee in 
decisions to dismiss the chief audit executive is an indicator of internal audit independence, and 
certainly the internal audit function will be more empowered (James, 2003). In other words, 
management pressure over the internal audit function is reduced by providing additional 
security for the CAE and consequently helping the internal auditor feel more comfortable, 
confident and courageous in undertaking audit inquiries, particularly when addressing sensitive 
issues that may indict senior management (Mat Zain et al., 2006). 
 
Building on behavioural theory, the involvement of the audit committee in hiring/firing 
decisions is deemed a stimulus that strengthens the moral courage of the chief audit executive. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that  
 
Hypothesis 4: The moral courage of the chief audit executive is positively related to the 
involvement of the audit committee in decisions related to his appointment and revocation. 
 
To ensure the effectiveness of the internal audit, Raghunandan et al. (2001) note that good 
interaction between management and the internal audit function is essential. According to these 
authors, two issues are particularly relevant. First, management must respond appropriately to 
the findings and suggestions of internal auditors. Second, management should not impose 
restrictions or barriers on internal audit activities. 
 
The Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) report (1999, p. 30) recognizes the importance of examining 
the relationship between management and the internal auditor, noting, "the audit committee is 
responsible for regularly reviewing the relationship between management and the external and 
internal auditors." Based on behavioural theory, we consider the review of management’s 
interaction with internal auditing a stimulus that fosters the moral courage of the CAE. Thus, 
we hypothesize that  
 
Hypothesis 5: The moral courage of the CAE is positively related to the audit committee 
reviewing management’s interaction with the internal audit. 
 
5. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Phase I: experiment 
 
5.1 Model 
 
The experiment employed a multivariate analysis to test the effect of independent variables on 
the moral courage of the CAE. To do so, a multiple regression analysis was run to test our 
hypotheses. 
 
5.2 Variables 
For the selection of independent variables that capture the interaction between the audit 
committee and the internal audit function, we rely on Scarbrough et al. (1998), Raghunandan 
et al. (2001) and Mat Zain et al. (2006) and on information collected by professionals (members 
of audit committees and internal auditors). Therefore, we have five independent variables: 
(1) The number of meetings between the audit committee and the CAE; 
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(2) The existence of private access for the CAE to the audit committee; 
(3) The review of internal auditing programs and results by the audit committee, 
(4)  The audit committee’s involvement in decisions concerning the appointment and dismissal 
of the CAE; and 
(5)  The review of the management’s interaction with internal audit. 
 
For variables related to the moral courage of the auditor, we rely on the measurement scale of 
Sekerka et al. (2009) (See appendix 1). 
 
5.2 Data collection 
 
Our sample choice was limited to listed companies because in the Tunisian context, there are 
only a few listed companies (75 companies) that have audit committees and internal auditors. 
Given the difficulty of communicating with listed companies in Tunisia, we were only able to 
contact 60 companies. These companies comprised 20 companies in the financial sector with a 
six-month turnover exceeding 12000 MDT and 40 companies in the industrial and commercial 
sectors with a six-month turnover exceeding 1700 MDT. The target population was the chief 
audit executives. 
 
We administered questionnaires to CAEs from 60 listed companies. Thirty-five questionnaires 
were administered in person, and the remaining twenty-five were sent electronically. Our 
questionnaire consisted of two parts. The first part collected information related to the 
composition of the audit committee and its relationship with the internal audit function. The 
second part collected information related to CAE and measures his/her level of moral courage 
using Sekerka et al.’s (2009) measurement scale (see Appendix 2). Questions were identified 
in the questionnaire based on the literature and by collaboration with two accounting professors. 
To ensure the reliability and validity of our questionnaire, we consulted three CAEs and two 
members of audit committees; we also asked two psychosociologists to review it to ensure that 
Sekerka et al.’s (2009) measurement scale for moral courage is applicable in the Tunisian 
context. To measure the moral courage of the CAE, we asked the question, "How do you act 
when confronted by irregularities and frauds committed by your top manager?" The internal 
auditor was then called to answer sub-questions that measured his/ her moral courage 
(according to the measurement scale of Sekerka et al. (2009)) on a scale from 1 to 5 based on a 
5-point Likert scale (1 = never true, 2 = rarely true, 3 = sometimes true, 4 = often true, and 5 = 
always true). These questions were translated from English to French by a translation specialist 
so that they are clear and understandable for CAEs. 
  
The data collection lasted nine weeks (in 2015) and allowed us to receive answers from 52 
CAEs; we were not able to obtain answers for eight questionnaires (sent electronically). Our 
final sample is composed of 52 listed companies, 20 of which are in the financial sector and 32 
of which are in other sectors. 
 
The respondents include 48 men and 4 women having between 12 and 21 years of experience. 
All respondents majored in accounting, and eleven of them hold a degree of chartered 
accountant. In addition, more than half of the CAEs asked are certified accountants 
(International Certificate in Internal Auditing or/and Professional Diploma of internal auditing). 
 
 
Phase II: interviews 
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To enhance the depth of our analysis of the results found through the multiple regression and 
to increase our understanding about how the working relationship with the audit committee can 
promote the moral courage of the chief audit executive, we performed semi-directed interviews 
with CAEs. In total, the field study involves 22 individual semi-directed interviews conducted 
among chief audit executives working in 22 listed companies. The final distribution of the 
different companies is as follows: eight firms are in the financial sector (36%), and fourteen are 
in other sectors (64%). 
 
Interviews were conducted between May and October 2015 with highly experienced chiefs 
audit executives who majored in accounting (mean experience = 15.6 years). The interviews 
lasted, on average, 1 h and were recorded and transcribed. To profoundly understand how the 
various activities stemmed from the interaction between the audit committee and the internal 
audit function can increase the moral courage of the chief audit executive; we asked respondents 
the questions shown in Appendix 3. We performed the content analysis of interview transcripts 
using the NVivo8 software. 
 
6. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
 
6.1 Quantitative test 
 
The analysis of the findings begins with an overview of the normative and legal environment 
of internal auditing in Tunisian organizations. 
 
6.1.1 Internal auditing in Tunisian organizations 
 
In contrast to the external audit profession in Tunisia, there is no formal or legal organization 
that addresses the internal audit profession. We can find the Internal Audit Tunisian Association 
(IATA), which has only the status of an association. There are no barriers to entry or exams to 
pass. Moreover, there is no obligation of adhesion, unlike the Association of Chartered 
Accountants of Tunisia. In addition, the IATA does not have disciplinary power or dismissal 
authority.  
 
We must note that several laws exist concerning internal audit that are largely promulgated in 
the context of credit companies (e.g., Section 34 of Law No. 2001-0065 relating to credit 
institutions and the circular concerning credit institutions No. 2006-19 related to internal control) 
and concerning initial public offerings (38 new Law No. 94-117 of November 14, 1994). 
Among the laws mentioned earlier, financial security law No. 2005-96, which was inspired by 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, remains the most significant law; it actually enhances internal audit 
and internal control mechanisms, including the creation of audit committees in credit and listed 
companies (Art.12). Additionally, since 2001, the creation of an audit committee has been an 
obligation for credit institutions respecting Law 2001-65. 
 
To enhance corporate governance procedures and financial transparency, the Guide of Good 
Practice of the Governance of Tunisian companies, promulgated in 2012, again emphasizes the 
necessity of creating an internal audit function and the establishment of an audit committee. In 
addition, the Guide illustrates ethical norms for business professionals. To conclude, it is 
important to note that there is a common consensus among Tunisian internal auditors about 
complying with international internal audit standards and the internal auditing code of ethics.  
6.1.2 Descriptive Statistics 
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Table 1 shows descriptive statistics. It shows details about number of meetings between audit 
committee and CAEs, with a maximum of six meetings per year. The audit committee provided 
private access to the chief audit executive in 16 of 52 (30.8 per cent) companies. The table also 
shows that all of the audit committees (100 per cent) review the internal auditing programs and 
results. However, only eighteen (34.6%) audit committees in our sample are involved in 
decisions concerning the appointment and dismissal of the chief audit executive. The remaining 
audit committees (65.4%) do not participate in these decisions because the manager has the 
entire authority to hire or/and fire CAEs. The last column shows that only eleven audit 
committees (21.2 per cent) examine the relationship between internal audit and management. 
Table 1: Audit Committee – Internal Audit Interaction: Descriptive Statistics 
The Number of meetings per year between audit committee 
and CAE 
Frequency 
Number (Percentage) 
2 6 (11.5%) 
3 21 (40.4%) 
4 9 (17.3%) 
5 9 (17.3%) 
6 7 (13.5%) 
Existence of private access to audit committee Frequency 
Number (Percentage) 
Yes 16 (30.8%) 
No 36 (69.2%) 
Review of internal auditing programs and results Frequency 
Number (Percentage) 
Yes 52 (100%) 
No 0 
Audit Committee’s involvement in decisions concerning 
the appointment and dismissal of the CAE 
Frequency 
Number (Percentage) 
Yes 18 (34.6%) 
No 34 (65.4%) 
Review of the relationship between internal audit and 
management 
Frequency 
Number (Percentage) 
Yes 11 (21.2%) 
No 41 (78.8%) 
 
6.1.3 Empirical findings 
 
A multiple regression analysis was performed to test our hypotheses. Moral Courage is our 
dependent variable.  Our independent variables are the following: MEET = Number of 
meetings per year between the audit committee and the chief audit executive; ACCE = 1 if the 
audit committee provides private access to the CAE, and 0 otherwise; REVIEW_PR = 1 if the 
audit committee reviews the internal auditing programs and result, and 0 otherwise; APP_DIS 
= 1 if the audit committee is involved in decisions concerning the appointment and dismissal 
of the CAE, and 0 otherwise; and MANG_AUD = 1 if the audit committee reviews 
management’s interaction with internal audit, and 0 otherwise.  
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Table 2 shows that only the existence of private access for the chief audit executive has a 
significantly positive effect on his/her moral courage, indicating that a discussion of sensitive 
issues without the presence of the manager makes the CAE more comfortable and truthful. 
Private access to the audit committee makes the CAE feel secure and therefore more courageous. 
We find, however, insignificant results for MEET, ACCE, REVIEW_PR, APP_DIS and 
MANG_AUD. Therefore, we accept H2, whereas we reject H1, H3, H4 and H5.  To deeply 
understand and analyze the findings stemming from this multiple regression, we conduct semi-
directive interviews with 22 CAEs. A content analysis of interviews is presented in the 
following section. 
 
Table 2: Multivariate analysis 
 Coefficients  t-Stata Significance 
Constant 2.546 9.241 0.000 
MEET 0.042 0.821 0.416 
ACCE 1.713 12.328 0.000 
REVIEW_PR 0.185 0.762 0.450 
APP_DIS -0.082 -0.768 0.447 
MANG_AUD -0.068 -0.838 0.406 
No. of observations 52 
Adjusted R Square 0.923 
F- test 123.275 
Significance 0.000 
 
 
6.2 Content analysis of interviews 
 
The results presented and analyzed in this part are the result of coding and analysis of data that 
have been collected through semi-directed interviews conducted with 22 CAEs (the term ‘CAE’ 
is used to refer to every interviewee). First, respondents recognize that “there are ways to tell 
the truth without losing your neck. They include talking to allies who can aid you such as the 
audit committee” (CAE 18). They add, “[…] the appearance of the audit committee provides 
more confidence for the chief audit executive and permits him/her to be more courageous” 
(CAE 9). 
Indeed, a working relationship between audit committees and chief audit executives can 
empower the latter and make them more courageous when reporting fraud manifested by their 
superiors: 
 “[…] with such interaction, a power base for the internal auditor can be established, thereby 
enabling him/her to perform his/her duties and obligations without fear” (CAE 21). 
 
Due to their major role in resolving problems generated by conflicts of interest that could face 
an internal auditor and their position concerning the Board, “audit committee members can 
largely support the chief audit executive if a fraud was reported” (CAE7).  
Respondents clarify that regular meetings between the audit committee and the chief audit 
executive are an indication of a strong relationship. In fact, periodic meetings permit the audit 
committee to be informed of any type of conflict or issues addressed and to resolve them timely. 
“It is recommended for the audit committee to meet the chief audit executive at least four times 
per year in order to rapidly resolve any conflict between the CAE and the manager” (CAE14). 
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Interviewees agree that “a strong relationship between the audit committee and the CAE is 
materialized by regular meetings which reinforce the responsibility of the CAE” (CAE 9), but 
they stress that the manager is generally present in these meetings, which can cause a problem 
for the chief audit executive. Indeed, “the chief audit executive cannot discuss issues concerning 
his/her manager when the latter is present in the meeting” (CAE 5). 
“It is highly difficult for the CAE to speak about management irregularities and malfeasances 
in the presence of his/her manager” (CAE19).  
“[…] In the presence of his/her manager, the chief audit executive keeps silent by fear” (CAE8). 
 
Therefore, “regular meetings between the audit committee and the chief audit executive can 
ensure a CAE who is more responsible but not necessarily a more courageous one” (CAE3). 
Recognizing the difficulty of the CAE discussing issues concerning the manager in his/her 
presence, interviewees add that the audit committee furnishes a private access for the chief audit 
executive to discuss sensitive issues without the presence of the manager. "[...] access face to 
face without the presence of the Manager” (CAE 2), to make him/her “more comfortable and 
then more courageous in discussing issues concerning his/her manager” (CAE 13). 
Thus, when the internal auditor detects fraud committed by his/her manager, he/she must 
immediately communicate with the audit committee to report the fraud without informing the 
manager:  
 “[…] I will ask for an urgent and private meeting with the audit committee with submission of 
the documents and proofs” (CAE 1). 
According to respondents, a review of the program and results of the internal audit by the audit 
committee “generally enhances the responsibility of the internal auditor for performing his/her 
duties” (CAE 14). However, “it is not a guarantee for the courage of the CAE” (CAE2) 
because it is insufficient to focus only on the program and results of internal auditing: 
 
 “[The] audit committee must not be limited [to] examining the audit programs and results; it 
must follow and verify if the recommendations of the chief audit executive are taken into 
consideration by the management” (CAE 18). 
 
In addition, the audit committee must “follow and examine the gap between the tasks noted in 
the plans and the tasks really done” (CAE 20). Thus, interviewees admit that they feel more 
controlled and supervised by the audit committee. Moreover, they then feel more responsible 
and courageous to behave with impartiality. This feeling was particularly evident in the 
responses given by CAE 2, CAE 8 and CAE 21, who associated their courage to tell the truth 
with the control exerted by the audit committee when comparing their plans with their results 
together with following up their recommendations: 
“This kind of control exerted by the audit committee over the chief audit executives may 
reinforce the efficiency of internal auditing by strengthening their responsibility sense and their 
courage to perform their duties regarding fraud report “ (CAE 8).  
 
Respondents insist that the status of the internal audit function has important implications for 
its effectiveness by increasing the courage of the chief audit executive. Therefore, every auditor 
should be personally, hierarchically and functionally independent from the audited entity: 
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“Dealing with conflict situations depends on degree of independence of the chief audit 
executive from his/her manager. This is one of the solutions that can necessarily reduce fear by 
reducing the power exerted by the manager, and then reducing risks stemming from his/her 
power because these are the risks that stimulate his/her fear” (CAE19). 
“The greater the independence of internal auditors, including freedom from management 
pressure, the greater the likelihood is that they can remain objective and free from bias” 
(CAE1). 
Interviewees believe that the greatest mistake is to let the chief audit executive be dependent on 
his/her manager. They claim that is insufficient for the audit committee to be only involved in 
hiring/firing decisions; “it must have the absolute decisions and authorities concerning the 
recruitment and dismissal of the CAE” (CAE3). 
“The audit committee can ensure the independence and increase the courage of the chief audit 
executive by having the absolute decisions related to his/her career”(CAE21).  
Therefore, “the audit committee will be a greater empowerment of the internal function” 
(CAE12). 
In other words, management influence over the internal audit function decreases; consequently, 
internal auditors would feel more confident and courageous in undertaking audit investigations, 
particularly when addressing more sensitive issues that may involve their managers.  
The necessity for giving complete authority to the audit committee concerning hiring/firing 
decisions is reiterated in the whole of responses of the chief audit executives and is revealed 
through the following interrogations:  
“I am going to control who? The manager? The manager who recruited me and who will 
dismiss me?!” (CAE 2) 
“To whom do I belong?” (CAE 4) 
“Am I attached to the audit committee that protects and supports me? Or am I attached to the 
manager who appointed and pays me?!” (CAE 7) 
 
Similarly, interviewees believe that reviewing the relationship between the manager and 
internal auditing permits a certain independence for the chief audit executive and permits the 
audit committee to be sure that the chief audit executive has all of the required tools to perform 
his/her work: 
“[…] this is why the audit committee must review the relationship between internal audit and 
the top management to ensure that the internal auditor has the whole necessary means to fulfil 
its function” (CAE 3). Respondents agree that reviewing the relationship between the manager 
and internal auditing “theoretically” allows the audit committee to verify whether the manager 
imposes restrictions and barriers to limit the auditing field. However, “in practice, it is not easy 
to detect if the manager puts barriers and/or exerts pressure over the CAE to restrict his/her 
fields of activity” (CAE 17). 
According to the respondents, audit committee members, in reality, remain incapable of 
detecting any pressure exerted by the manager because the above-described behaviour is a type 
of control that “requires the daily presence of the members of [the] audit committee in the 
company” (CAE 8).  
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 “[F]or these reasons, examination of management’s interaction with IAF by the audit 
committee cannot be a guarantee for the moral courage of the CAE” (CAE14). 
The responses given by interviewees and presented above can greatly explain our findings 
related to the effect of work relationships between the audit committee and the IAF on the moral 
courage of the CAE.  
 
7. DISCUSSION 
 
Building on behavioural theory, we propose that the audit committee-internal audit interaction 
is an organizational factor that influences the moral courage of the chief audit executive. We 
define a higher number of meetings with the audit committee and the CAE, the existence of 
private access for the latter, the review of internal auditing programs and results by the audit 
committee, the audit committee’s involvement in hiring/firing decisions and the review of 
management’s interaction with internal audit as organizational stimuli that promote the moral 
courage of the CAE to act ethically.  
 
Regression analysis shows that the number of meetings between the audit committee and the 
CAE has an insignificant effect on the auditor’s moral courage. This finding is inconsistent with 
the ideas of Scarbrough et al. (1998), Raghunandan et al. (2001), Mat Zain et al. (2006) and 
Alzeban (2015), who note that direct and formal communication between the audit committee 
and the CAE reduces the internal auditor’s fear of being punished or dismissed because such 
communication decreases the overall pressure and reinforces his/her feeling of being supported 
by the audit committee, which promotes the courage to act independently and objectively. The 
responses given by respondents clarify that regular meetings between the audit committee and 
the CAE may not increase the moral courage of the latter because the manager is generally 
present in these meetings. Consequently, the CAE cannot discuss issues concerning his/her 
manager and keeps silent out of fear. 
 
The existence of private access to the audit committee is significantly positively related to the 
moral courage of the CAE. Interviewees explain that providing an access face to face for the 
CAE to the audit committee makes him/her feel more protected and in turn feel less fear. Hence, 
he/she becomes more courageous to discuss and report related to the manager. This result 
supports James’ (2003) suggestion that the internal auditor’s reluctance to report problems to 
the audit committee appears to be exacerbated by restrictions on access to the committee; access 
helps the internal auditor become more comfortable and more courageous when discussing 
sensitive issues in the absence of his/her top manager (Scarbrough et al., 1998; Raghunandan 
et al., 2001). 
 
The review of internal auditing programs and results by the audit committee cannot enhance 
the moral courage of the CAE. Our findings concerning this hypothesis diverge from the 
assertions of Roussy (2013) and Raghunandan et al. (2001), who indicate that a review of both 
the internal audit plans and the results makes the internal auditors more responsible in fulfilling 
their duties. Based on the responses provided by interviewees, we can explain our findings by 
noting that the audit committee does not deeply examine the programs and results of internal 
auditing and does not pursue gaps between the tasks noted in the plans and the tasks actually 
done. Consequently, this lack can make internal auditors less responsible and reliable because 
their work is not controlled by the audit committee. 
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Our findings concerning the fourth hypothesis go against the suggestions of Allison (1994), 
James (2003), Stewart and Subramaniam (2010) and Alzeban (2015). These suggestions note 
that when the audit committee is involved in decisions to appoint and dismiss the CAE, such 
involvement should encourage internal auditors to conduct their responsibilities and objectively 
report their findings without fear of reprisals or threats of dismissal. Interviewees, however, 
indicate that the audit committee’s involvement in CAE hiring/firing decisions may not enhance 
the moral courage of the CAE later because the audit committee does not make the absolute 
decision. In fact, the audit committee must have complete authority concerning the career of 
the CAE to ensure his/her independence and increase his/her courage.  
 
The result of the final hypothesis shows that the audit committee’s review of the interaction 
between the manager and internal audit does not have a significant effect on the moral courage 
of the CAE. This result is inconsistent with the suggestion of Raghunandan et al. (2001), who 
note that when the audit committee ensures that management does not impose restrictions or 
barriers to the activities of internal audit, the internal auditor becomes more courageous and 
objective by feeling supported by the audit committee. Building on the responses furnished by 
interviewees, we can explain this finding by noting that the audit committee, in practice, 
remains unable to detect whether a manager exerts pressure on the internal auditor or whether 
he/she limits his/her area of activity. 
 
8. SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, AND LIMITATIONS 
 
The audit committee and internal audit are two mechanisms of corporate governance that aim 
to improve financial transparency and investor protection. The relationship between these 
mechanisms includes various activities such as meetings between the audit committee and the 
CAE, the existence of private access to the CAE, the review of the program and the results of 
the internal audit by the audit committee, the involvement of the audit committee in decisions 
concerning the appointment and dismissal of the CAE and the review of the relationship 
between internal audit and management. 
 
Based on a mixed approach, this study shows that interaction between the audit committee and 
internal audit might enhance the moral courage of the CAE by providing private access for 
him/her. We find insignificant the relationship between the number of meetings between the 
audit committee and the CAE and his/her moral courage. Similarly, the contribution of the audit 
committee to the appointment and dismissal of CAE, the examination of internal audit programs 
and results together with the audit committee’s examination of interaction between 
management and the IAF do not have a significant effect on the moral courage of the CAE. 
Additionally, the content analysis of interviews permits us to deeply understand and clarify how 
a working relationship between audit committee and internal auditing can spur the moral 
courage of the CAE to report fraud manifested by his/her manager. 
 
This paper contributes to the auditing literature by providing the first study to identify the effect 
of the relationship between the audit committee and the internal audit function on the moral 
courage of the CAE. In our work, we rely on organizational psychology and the ethics 
literature to highlight the importance of moral courage to the ethical behaviour of the internal 
auditor. Recognizing that moral courage is the missing ingredient in the instruction of ethics 
(Comer and Vega, 2011), we believe that our study is interesting to the IIA. It can encourage 
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the IIA to concentrate not only on the ethics of auditing but also on considering the moral 
courage of the internal auditor.  
 
In addition, the IIA’s standards, which continue to focus on imposing regulation and demanding 
compliance controls rather than building moral strength, should rethink the question, “Why is 
moral courage in the workplace viewed as the unusual, rather than the norm?” (Sekerka and 
Bagozzi, 2007, p.132) Furthermore, we contend that our study can make business schools more 
aware about training accounting students to develop moral courage during ethical courses 
because it is insufficient to know what they should do; they also must have the courage to do it. 
Our findings, which note the effect of the audit committee on the moral courage of the CAE, 
offer a practical solution for academic researchers, professional organizations and institutions 
together with governance agencies (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) that seek to encourage 
internal auditors to speak about management fraud and not keep silent. Thus, we encourage 
regulators and standard setters to draft regulations and oversee the relationship between audit 
committees and the internal audit function to decrease the pressure exerted by the manager and 
to reduce fear of reprisals or threats of dismissal when reporting accurate information. Similarly, 
we believe these actors can benefit from our study by obliging public companies in Tunisia to 
establish audit committees to collaborate with internal auditors, support them and enhance their 
objectivity and independence. 
 
Our study has limitations. First, we are limited to listed companies; hence, the sample size is 
small. Second, there is only one study (Sekerka et al., 2009) that provides a measurement scale 
of professional moral courage. Finally, we did not integrate individual variables such as gender 
and age. Future research might extend the results of this research by integrating other variables 
such as gender, political context (democratic or authoritarian) and national culture. Researchers 
who are interested in external auditing can also apply this topic to discover the effect of the 
audit committee on the external auditor. 
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Theme 1: Moral agency 
 
1. I am the type of person who is unfailing when 
it comes to doing the right thing at work. 
 
2. When I do my job, I regularly take additional 
measures to ensure my actions reduce harms to 
others. 
 
3. My work associates would describe me as 
someone who is always working to achieve 
ethical performance, making every effort to be 
honorable in all my actions. 
 
 
Theme 2: Multiple values 
 
4. I am the type of person who uses a guiding set 
of principles from the organization as when I 
make ethical decisions on the job. 
 
5. No matter what, I consider how both my 
organization’s values and my personal values 
apply to the situation before making decisions. 
 
6. When making decisions, I often consider how 
my role in the organization, my command, and 
my upbringing must be applied to any final 
action. 
 
 
Theme 3: Endurance of threats 
 
7. When I encounter an ethical challenge, I take it 
on with moral action; regardless of how it may 
pose have a negative impact on how others see 
me. 
 
 8. When my job record may be affected 
negatively, I am unlikely to get involved with an 
ethical challenge. 
 
 9. I am the type of person who wants to keep 
things subdued, not raise issues or put myself or 
others in jeopardy by bringing a moral issue 
forward. 
 
Theme 4: Going beyond compliance 
 
10. My coworkers would say that when I 
do my job, I do more than follow the regulations: 
I do everything I can to ensure actions are morally 
sound. 
 
11. When I go about my daily tasks, I make sure 
to comply with the rules, but also look to 
understand their intent, to ensure that this is being 
accomplished as well. 
 
12. It is important that we go beyond the legal 
requirements but seek to accomplish our tasks 
with ethical action as well. 
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Theme 5: moral goals 
 13. It is important for me to use prudential 
judgment in making decisions at work. 
 
14. I think about my motives when achieving the 
mission to ensure they are based upon moral 
ends. 
 
15. When engaged in action, I do not typically 
consider how virtuous my motives are as I move 
to accomplish objectives. 
 
 
Appendix 2: Questionnaire 
As part of the development of a research paper on the interaction between the audit committee and 
internal audit, I offer you a questionnaire that will be used to collect data to address the study objectives. 
It should be noted that the information collected will be treated confidentially. 
I would be grated for your collaboration and your close involvement in this project.  
Company Name: ………………………………….. 
1-  Interaction between the audit committee and the internal audit function 
 
1.1 How many members does the audit committee have in your company? 
 
1.2 What is the number of independent members of your audit committee?  
1.3 What is the number of meetings between the audit committee and you in a year?   
1.4 Are you are privileged with private access to the audit committee? Yes  
No  
1.5 Does the audit committee review the program and the results of the internal audit? Yes  
No  
1.6 Is the audit committee involved in the decisions regarding the appointment and 
dismissal of the head of internal audit? 
Yes   
 
No  
 
1.7 Does the audit committee review the interaction between top management and the 
internal audit function? 
Yes  
No  
31 
 
 
2-6- How do you act when facing an ethical dilemma (your top manager has committed fraud or irregularities)? 
Describe your response by checking one of the boxes. 
 
 
2- Qualifications of the head of internal audit 
2-1-Training level 
 
 
 
 
Level 
Bachelor's degree or equivalent  
Bachelor degree + 2  
or equivalent 
 
Bachelor degree +3 =  license  
Bachelor degree +4  
Bachelor degree +5 or +6  
Doctorate and + 
 
 
Other  
 
 
2-3-The number of years of experience in 
auditing 
 
Experience 
< 2 years  
Between2 and5 years  
> 5 years  
1 
Never true 
2 
Rarely true 
3 
Sometimes true 
4 
Often true 
5 
Always true 
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1- Appendix 3: As part of the development of a research paper on the effect of the interaction 
between the audit committee and internal audit on the moral courage of the chief audit executive 
 
1.You are the type of person who is unfailing when it comes to doing the 
right thing at work. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
2. When you do your job, you regularly take additional measures to ensure 
your actions reduce harm to others. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
3.Your work associates would describe you as someone who is always 
working to achieve ethical performance, making every effort to be 
honorable in all your actions. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
4.You are the type of person who uses a guiding set of principles from the 
organization when you make ethical decisions on the job. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
5.No matter what, you consider how both your organization’s values and 
your personal values apply to the situation before making decisions. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
6.When making decisions, you often consider how your role in the 
organization, your command, and your upbringing must be applied to any 
final action. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
7.When you encounter an ethical challenge, you take it on with moral 
action, regardless of whether it may pose a negative impact on how others 
see you. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
8.When your job record may be affected negatively, you are unlikely to get 
involved with an ethical challenge. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
9.You are the type of person who wants to keep things subdued and you do 
not raise issues or put yourself or others in jeopardy by bringing a moral 
issue forward. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
10.Your coworkers would say that when you do your job, you do more than 
follow the regulations: you do everything you can to ensure actions are 
morally sound. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
11.When you go about your daily tasks, you make sure to comply with the 
rules but also look to understand their intent to ensure that this is being 
accomplished as well. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
12.It is important that you go beyond the legal requirements but seek to 
accomplish your tasks with ethical action as well. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
13.It is important for you to use prudential judgment in making decisions 
at work. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
14. You think about your motives when achieving the mission to ensure 
that they are based upon moral ends. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
15.When engaged in action, you do not typically consider how virtuous 
your motives are when you move to accomplish objectives. 1 2 3 4 5 
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to the disclosure of fraud and irregularities committed by his/her manager, we thank you to give 
us a little of your time to answer questions of this investigation. Do you see that the audit 
committee plays a role in promoting the courage of the CAE to tell the truth? How? 
2- Can you explain how the working relationship between audit committee members and the CAE 
can enhance the courage of this later? 
3- Do you view that the meetings between the audit committee members and the CAE can spur the 
courage of this later? Why? 
4- Do you consider the existence of private access to the audit committee as a guarantee for the 
courage of the CAE? 
5- How reviewing the internal audit plans and results by the audit committee can increase the moral 
courage of the CAE? 
6- Do you believe that the involvement of audit committee in hiring/firing decisions can be a 
stimulus of the moral courage of the CAE by ensuring his/her independence? 
7- How can the review of management’s interaction with the internal auditing function increase 
the moral courage of the CAE? 
 
 
